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Article 9

NOTES AND COMMENTS

INSURANCE
SEVERABILITY OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Plaintiff, assignee of a life insurance contract with disability
clause, sued for breach of the life insurance feature. The policy provided for, separate premiums, one for disability insurance and the
other for life insurance. In a previous suit the insured had recovered for breach of the disability clause. Held, life insurance and disability clause constituted two distinct contracts and assignee had a
separate cause of action. Armstrong v. Illinois Bankers Life Association, 29 N. E. (2d) 415 (Ind. 1940).
The court, in declaring the contract severable, relies upon the
facts that the risk upon the two types of insurance is different and
the consideration is apportioned. Since the contract is severable, there
are two causes of action and a recovery for disability benefits in a
previous suit is not res judicata to a suit for life insurance. Rosso v.
New York Life Insurance Company, 157 Miss. 469, 128 So. 343, 69

A. L. R. 883, 889 (1930).
The test most frequently applied by the courts to determine severability in contract cases is whether the consideration is entire or
apportioned. Thompson v. Fesler, 74 Ind. App. 80, 123 N. E. 188
(1920). In a previous case with facts similar to the principal case,
an Indiana court denied recovery on the consideration test, since a
single premium was paid. Indiana Life Endowment Co. v. Carnithan,
62 Ind. App. 567, 109 N. E. 851 (1916). In fire insurance cases the
courts have adopted a further test that where the risk on one insured
item is affected by the risk on the other insured item, the contract
is entire. Havens v. The Home Insurance Co., 111 Ind. 90, 12 N. E. 137
(1887). The risk test now seems to be applied to supplement the
consideration test in life insurance policies with disability clauses.
Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Barry, 213 Ind. 56, 10 N.E. (2d) 614
(1937). In fire insurance policies the risk test alone is sufficient to
declare a contract severable even where the premium is single. The
Phenix Insurance Co. of Brooklyn v. Pickel, 119 Ind. 155, 21 N. E.
546 (1889). The principal case is in accord with other jurisdictions
declaring the contract severable on the test of consideration. Rosso v.
New York Life Insurance Company, 157 Miss. 469, 128 So. 343, 69
A. L. R. 883 (1930). The inclusion of the risk test is, however, unique
and in view of the Carnithancase, it is doubtful if the test would be sufA.M.H.
ficient, by itself, to make the contract severable.

LABOR
LABOR BOARD BACK PAY ORDERS
The National Labor Relations Board, having found petitioner had
wrongfully discharged employees, ordered reinstatement of employees
with back-pay, less monies received by them, during period of discharge, from labor upon work relief projects. The Board further ordered petitioner to make payment of this deducted amount to the

